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ABSTRACT 
We analyse the effects of immigration quotas on growth and discounted welfare in a
North-South version of the quality ladders growth model. Immigration quotas in the
North increase the growth rate of utility for all consumers. However, they lower the
static utility level and discounted welfare of Northern workers. Also the discounted
welfare of asset owners drops. Hence, unlike in the static migration model where the
representative agent in the host country benefits from immigration, in our dynamic
migration model, the representative agent loses despite a positive growth effect of
immigration. In general, the winners of a liberal immigration policy in the North are the
immigrants and the remaining workers in the South. 
*This project has been financially supported by a grant from HSFR, (the Swedish
Council for Research in Humanities and Social Sciences).
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The countries that have applied for full membership are Hungary, Poland, the Czech
1
Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and
Cyprus. They have been granted membership conditional on their market economy,
democratic and legal status.
A calculation for 1990 in Layard HWDO(1992).
2
Note that we say SRWHQWLDO mass immigration. Actual immigration may be
3
considerably less since low vacancy rates and regulated labor markets in the EU may
prevent large scale immigration. See Lundborg (1997).
,QWURGXFWLRQ
Many countries today face a situation of potential mass immigration. There are strong
incentives for workers to migrate from low-wage, densely populated countries in Asia
and Latin America to the United States and Canada. European countries experience a
similar situation of potential mass immigration with respect to workers from North
African countries. Also, the fact that the former communist countries in Eastern Europe
and in Russia no longer prevent their workers from emigrating means that the European
Union could increase its labor force substantially by allowing for large scale
immigration from the East. 
Indeed, the eastward enlargement which now is on the Union’s agenda implies
that many East European countries will be encompassed by the Union’s free labor
market after they have become members. Three facts suggest that such a labor
1
market integration could give rise to potential mass immigration into the EU. First, real
wage differences between most of the present EU members and the candidate countries
are huge. For example, a typical Polish worker who migrates to work in Germany but
spends his income in Poland can raise his real wage by a factor of ten.  Though growth
2
rates are higher in the Eastern European countries than in the present EU, large real
wage differences are likely to prevail for many years. Secondly, the labor force in the
poor candidate countries is large, approximately 50 million people, which also suggests
large potential migration flows. Finally, the geographical vicinity implies small moving
costs associated with migration.
3
In this paper we analyze the growth and welfare effects of large immigration
quotas and long run integration that could imply mass immigration. Quotas have been a
major policy tool in the rich countries, implemented already by Great Britain in 19052
Free trade and foreign aid conditional on economic reform are other
4
recommendations by Layard HWDO to lower migration incentives.
See Braun (1993), Dolado, Goria and Ichino (1993) and chapter 9 in Barro and 
5
Sala-i-Martin (1995).
and by the United States in 1921. The high growth rates in the developed countries have
raised immigration incentives and made immigration quotas increasingly important as a
policy measure. We want to illuminate the desirability of large quotas and to obtain
some indications of the growth and welfare effects of, for instance, extending the
NAFTA agreement to include large immigration quotas  and the EU’s policy of open
borders towards Eastern Europe.
Basic economic intuition indicates that large welfare gains can be achieved if
labor is allowed free international mobility. In studying the incentives for emigration
from the formerly centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe to the EU, Layard HW
DO (1992) suggest that the Union should stimulate growth and welfare in these countries
by offering them, among other things, considerably larger immigration quotas.  The
4
effects of quotas on the countries of immigration, though, are far from clear. In this
paper, we investigate the growth and welfare effects of immigration quotas for both
source and destination countries. We also explore the effects of taxing immigrants and
of allowing only rich workers to immigrate.
We use an endogenous growth model developed by Segerstrom HWDO (1990), and
Grossman and Helpman (1991a) to study the implications of immigration for growing
economies. In this "quality ladders" model, economic growth is driven by the R&D
decisions of profit maximizing firms, which compete in races over time to develop new
higher quality products. According to Scherer (1980), 59% of firm R&D expenditure is,
in fact, aimed at improving existing products. By focusing on the dramatic
improvements over time in the quality of many goods and services, the quality ladders
model provides a simple but appealing explanation for economic growth. 
Most of what has been done so far on migration and growth utilizes growth
models of the Solow vintage, with an exogenous given rate of technological change.
5
This literature ignores the possible effects of immigration on innovation and
technological change. This is, in our view, a great drawback since immigration is likely3
Labor migration has been studied using one-country endogenous growth models. For
6
instance, Rivera-Batiz (1994) treats immigration as an increase in the population of
a single isolated country, using the Romer (1990) endogenous growth model. While
this approach has the advantage of simplicity one drawback is that the  incentives for
migration cannot be analyzed. Another drawback is that treating migration as merely
a population increase in the immigration country ignores the corresponding
population decrease in the emigration country and its economic ramifications in both
countries.
to stimulate economic growth if workers move from regions of low-tech production (the
South) to regions of high-tech production (the North). We also observe a more than
proportional migration of R&D workers in the South-North direction. Thanks to recent
developments in the endogenous growth literature, we are today in a position to explore
how immigration influences firm behavior, technological change and economic growth. 
The quality ladders model was originally constructed for analyzing other issues
but we show that this model is useful for understanding the consequences of migration.
Not only is there an interesting link between migration and technology, as discussed
above, but our version of the quality ladders model also possesses properties that are
consistent with real world observations on international migration. In the model,
workers in the South have strong incentives to migrate to the North and compared to the
North, the South is characterized by i)  labor abundance, ii)  low wages, iii) a low utility
level, iv)  low levels of R&D, v)  production of low-tech goods, vi)  low rates of quality
upgrading per time period, and, vii)  production of low-price goods. Besides these
highly appealing properties, we believe that a model in which growth rests on
technological change is highly suitable for understanding the effects of immigration
quotas.
6
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we present our dynamic
general equilibrium North-South migration model and solve for the international
migration incentives of workers. With two asymmetric countries, this model is
complicated and we explore its public policy implications using computer simulations.
The results of these simulations are reported  in section 3. In addition to studying the
effects of immigration quotas, we explore some alternative policies that may be more
beneficial to the North: taxation of immigrants and selective immigration quotas. We
also study the effects of population restrictions in the South and R&D subsidies on4
migration incentives, growth and discounted welfare. Section 4 summarizes our
findings and offers some final remarks.
7KH0RGHO
6RPH*HQHUDO&RPPHQWV
We will analyze a quality ladders growth model with two structurally different
countries, the North and the South. Our review of how the basic quality ladders model
works will be brief so as to provide more space for describing how we extend this
model. For more details concerning the basic model, see Grossman and Helpman
(1991a,b). 
In this model of the world economy, there is a continuum of industries with
individual industries indexed by T,[0,1]. Industries T$" are high-tech and situated in
the North and industries T<"  are low-tech and situated in the South. In the North, firms
participate in high-tech R&D races and in the South, firms participate in low-tech R&D
races, implying that we assume away inter-regional R&D targeting but focus solely on
intra-regional targeting. 
In each industry, firms are distinguished by the quality Mof the products they
produce. Higher values of M denote higher quality and Mis restricted to take on integer
values. At time W=0, the state-of-the-art quality product in each industry isM=0, that is,
some firm in each industry knows how to produce aM=0 quality product and no firm
knows how to produce any higher quality product. To learn how to produce higher
quality products, firms in each industry engage in R&D races. In general, when the
state-of-the-art quality in an industry isM, the next winner of a R&D race becomes the
sole producer of aM+1 quality product. Since firms are Bertrand price-setters, each R&D
race winner is able to price lower quality competitors out of business and take over the
world market in its industry. Thus, over time, product quality improves as innovations
push each industry up its quality ladder.
In each of the two countries, the North and the South (top index n and s,
respectively), labor is the only input in both production and research. In both countries,























North, a worker produces, say, one computer and in the South a worker produces one
pair of shoes.) The native worker endowments in the two countries, L  and L ,
ns
respectively, are fixed and change only with migration. Labor markets in both countries
are perfectly competitive and firms are free to hire as many workers as they desire to
engage in either production or research. We treat the wage rate in the South as the
numeraire and let w denote the relative wage of North’s workers. Free trade prevails
between the two countries.
&RQVXPHU%HKDYLRU
All consumers live forever, have identical preferences and maximize discounted utility
where D is the subjective discount rate and log XW is each consumer´s static utility at
time t. This static utility is given by:
where d(j,t,T) denotes the quantity consumed of a product of quality M produced in
industry T at time W and 8 , 8 >1 represents the extent to which higher quality products
ns
improve on lower quality products in the North and the South, respectively.
At each point in time t, each consumer allocates expenditure E to maximize log
u(t) given the prevailing market prices. Solving this budget allocation problem yields a
unit elastic demand function
where d is quantity demanded and p is the market price for the product in each industry
with the lowest quality adjusted price. The quantity demanded for all other products is
zero. Given this static demand behavior, each consumer chooses the path of expenditure
over time to maximize (1) subject to the usual intertemporal budget constraint. Solving
this optimal control problem yieldsG((W)
GW
/((W) ' U(W)&D
BQ(S) ' (S&Z)( Q/S ,
0,
S ï8 Q Z




that is, a constant expenditure path is optimal if and only if the market interest rate
equals D. We will restrict attention to steady state properties of the model. Then D is the
equilibrium interest rate throughout time and consumer expenditure is constant over




Since one unit of labor produces one unit of output regardless of quality, and the
Southern wage rate has been normalized to equal one, every Southern firm has a
constant marginal cost equal to one and every Northern firm has a constant marginal
cost equal to w. When a non-leader firm innovates, it becomes the single quality leader
in its industry. We assume that Southern workers are not capable of doing high-tech
R&D which implies that low-tech firms only target their R&D resources at developing
better low-tech products. While Northern workers are capable of doing low-tech R&D,
they choose not to do so since the wage in the South is lower; consequently high-tech
firms target their R&D resources at developing better high-tech products. Since low-
tech firms are located in the South and high-tech firms in the North, targeting takes
place across firms within the same country. As shown by Grossman and Helpman
(1991a,b), it does not pay for industry leaders to do R&D and improve their own
products. Hence, the identity of industry leaders change whenever innovation occurs.
Consider the profits earned by a Northern leader selling to Northern consumers
and competing against a Northern follower. With the follower charging a price of w, the
lowest price such that losses are avoided, the new quality leader earns instantaneous
profits7
where p is the quality leader’s price. These profits are maximized by choosing p=8 w.
n
Therefore, this quality leader earns as a reward for its innovative activity the profit flow
(1-1/8 )E ,  and none of the other firms in the industry can do any better than break even
nn
by selling nothing at all to Northern consumers. When the firm sells to Southern
consumers, it earns the profit flow (1-1/8 )E  so that total profits are B  =(1-1/8 )(E
ns n n n
+E ). Likewise, a Southern firm earns the profit flow B  =(1-1/8 )(E +E ) from selling in
s s s n s
both the North and the South.
We allow for differences between the North and the South in R&D subsidy rates,
endowments of labor, R&D abilities of workers and ownership shares of world assets.
5	'$FWLYLWLHVE\)LUPV
The returns to engaging in R&D are independently distributed across industries and
over time. Consider the R&D behavior of firms in the North (corresponding conditions
apply to the South). In industry T at time t, let R  denote firm i´s employment of R&D i
n
labor and let  R/   3R  denote the industry-wide R&D employment. Firm i´s
nn
ii 
instantaneous probability of winning the R&D race and becoming the next quality
leader is assumed to equal R /(a+bR ), where a 0 and bë0 are R&D technology i
nn
parameters. Individual R&D firms behave competitively and treat R  as given, not
n
influenced by their choice of R  [as in Dixit (1988)]. i
n
  This R&D formulation with b=0 is used in Grossman and Helpman (1991a,b) and
corresponds to assuming constant returns to R&D. By allowing for b>0, we consider a
broader range of possibilities. With b>0, each firm´s instantaneous probability of
success is a decreasing function of industry-level R&D effort. One way to interpret this
property is that when firms do more R&D, R&D duplication becomes more likely and
success in the R&D laboratory becomes less likely to translate into profits in the
relevant product market. Individual R&D firms can be hurt when other firms do more
R&D if it becomes less likely that they will be rewarded for R&D success. It is this
instantaneous probability of being rewarded in the relevant product market that we are
ultimately concerned with. The instantaneous probability that some firm will be
rewarded for R&D success is R /(a+bR ). When b>0, this is a strictly concave function
nn
and there are decreasing returns to R&D at the industry level.8
The unattractive implications of assuming b=0 are explored in more detail in
7
Davidson and Segerstrom (1998).
  R&D is only undertaken by Northern firms in industries with a Northern leader
and R&D is only undertaken by Southern firms in industries with a Southern leader.
Thus we can distinguish between Northern and Southern R&D races. Let L  and L
ns
denote the expected discounted rewards for winning Northern and Southern R&D races,
respectively. Likewise, let s and s  denote R&D subsidy rates chosen by the Northern
ns
 
and Southern governments, respectively. Then, in Northern R&D races, each firm i
chooses its R&D employment R  to maximize instantaneous profits  LR/(a+bR )-w(1- ii
nn n n
s) R, where R/ 3R is the industry-wide employment of labor in a Northern R&D race.
nn n n
ii i
And in Southern R&D races, each firm i chooses its R&D employment R  to maximize i
s
instantaneous profits  LR/(a+bR )-(1-s )R , where R/ 3 R is the industry-wide
ss s s s s  s
ii i i
employment of labor in a Southern R&D race.
In a steady state equilibrium, firms will determine their R&D levels so that in the
Northern country L =w(a+bR )(1-s ), and applying the same reasoning to the Southern
nn n
R&D firm´s maximization problem yields L =(a+bR )(1-s ).  We can now see the
ss s
advantage of allowing for diminishing returns to R&D (b>0). When b>0, we obtain a
positive relationship between the reward for winning a R&D race (L) and how much
R&D is done (R). Slightly higher rewards lead to slightly more R&D. When b=0, R&D
behavior becomes infinitely sensitive to the size of the reward. For example, starting
from L =wa(1-s ), the slightest increase in L  leads firms to want to choose R =+4 and
nn n n
the slightest decrease in  L  leads firms to want to choose R =0. In the interest of
nn
obtaining reasonable results, we focus mainly on the properties of the model when b is
greater than zero.
7
We will now determine the equilibrium rewards for winning R&D races. From
equation (4), in any steady state equilibrium, the market interest rate must equal D. Not
only must we discount profits using D, but we must also take into account that every
quality leader is eventually driven out of business by another firm that innovates. For a
Northern leader, this occurs with instantaneous probability R /(a+bR ) and for a Southern
nn
leader, this occurs with instantaneous probability  R /(a+bR ). Thus we obtain as
ss
equilibrium R&D conditions:<Q ' (1&1/8Q)(( Q%( V)
D%RQ/(D%ERQ)
' Z(D%ERQ)(1&V Q)
<V ' (1&1/8V)(( Q%( V)
D%RV/(D%ERV)
' (D%ERV)(1&V V).
/ Q'(1&")(( Q/8QZ%( V/8QZ%RQ).







These two equations capture the idea that, in equilibrium, Northern leaders are
eventually driven out of business by Northern innovation, and Southern leaders are
eventually driven out of business by Southern innovation.
/DERU0DUNHWV
The proportion 1-" of industries have Northern leaders. Each Northern leader employs
E/ 8w workers for domestic production and E /8 w workers for export production.
n n s n
Northern firms do R&D and employ R  workers per industry. Thus, full employment of
n
Northern labor L implies that 
n 
The proportion " of industries have Southern quality leaders. Each Southern
leader employs E /8   workers for domestic production and E /8   workers for export
s s n n
production. In each of the "-industries, Southern firms do R&D and employ R  workers
s
per industry. Thus, full employment of Southern labor L  implies that 
s
&RQVXPHU([SHQGLWXUHV
To close the model, we need to determine consumer expenditures in each country. In the
Northern country, steady state consumer expenditure E  must equal wage income plus
n 
interest income on assets owned minus taxes paid to finance the Northern R&D subsidy.$ Z'"(D%ERV)(1&V V)%(1&")Z(D%ERQ)(1&V Q).
( Q'Z/ Q%DN["(D%ERV)(1&V V)%(1&")Z(D%ERQ)(1&V Q)]&V QZRQ(1&").





The value of all assets owned in the world economy A  equals the stock market value of
w
all the leader firms in the world economy, i.e. A ="L  + (1-")L . Substituting for L and
ws n n  
L  using (6) and (7) respectively, we obtain
s 
Let N denote the share of world assets owned by Northern country consumers. Then
DNA  is Northern interest income and D(1-N)A  is Southern interest income. To
ww  
determine the Northern tax revenues that need to be raised to finance the Northern R&D
subsidies, we note first that R (1-") workers do R&D in the Northern country. These
n
workers are paid wR (1-") and the government pays the fraction s  of this wage bill.
n n
Thus the Northern government must raise  s wR (1-") in taxes to finance the R&D
nn  
subsidy. Putting this all together, Northern consumer expenditure E  =wL +DNA-
nn  w
sw R (1-" )  becomes:
nn
In the South, R"  workers do R&D, are paid R"  and the Southern government pays the
ss
fraction s  of this wage bill. Thus, the Southern government must raise s R"  in taxes to
s  ss
finance its R&D subsidy. Since Southern consumer expenditures must also equal wage
income plus interest income on assets owned minus taxes paid to finance the Southern
R&D subsidy, we obtain:
We have now completed the presentation of the two-country endogenous growth model
and it is useful at this stage to sum it up. We have derived six equations;  Northern and







conditions (Equations (8) and (9)), and Northern and Southern expenditure conditions
(Equations (11) and (12)). Thus we have six equations in five unknowns (E , E , R , R
ns n s
and w). However, since the model is a general equilibrium model, Walras Law applies,
and if five of the six equations are satisfied, the sixth equation must also be satisfied.
Thus we can solve the model for a steady state equilibrium by solving a system of five
equations in five unknowns.
:HOIDUHDQG*URZWK
We calculate consumer welfare (discounted consumer utility) starting from time t=0 in
each of the two countries. Remember that all consumers are assumed to have identical
preferences. Consider first the utility of a Northern consumer with steady state
expenditure e . At any point in time, this consumer only buys the highest quality product
n
in each industry, and from (3), this consumer´s static demand function is given by
d(j,t,T)=e /p (j,t,T). This  consumer buys from a Northern leader charging the price 8
nn n
w in (1-") industries and from a Southern leader charging the price 8  in " industries. 
s
Before we substitute this information into (2) we note that, in this equation, I log8 dT 0
" s
+I log8 dT  t["I l o g  8 + (1-")I  log 8   ] where I  and I  are the steady state industry- "
1 n s s n n s n
wide instantaneous probability of R&D success in the South and the North, respectively. 
[See Grossman and Helpman (1991a, p. 50)]. In " industries, the instantaneous
probability of R&D success is R /(a+bR ) and in 1-" industries, the instantaneous
ss
probability of R&D success is R /(a+bR ). Substituting all the above information into (2)
nn
yields the Northern consumer´s instantaneous utility 
For a Southern consumer with steady state expenditure e , the situation is slightly
s
different. This consumer buys from a Northern leader charging the price 8  w in (1-")
n
industries and from a Southern leader charging the price 8  in " industries. Substituting
s
this information into (2), along with the redefined integral, yields the Southern
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Substituting (13) and (14) into (1), we obtain discounted welfare expressions for both
Northern and Southern consumers: 
and
Comparing (13) and (14), we see that the expressions are identical, except for
expenditures, e  and e . In particular, the time derivatives of log u (t) and log u (t) are
ns n s
identical. This means that individuals in both countries must experience LGHQWLFDO
JURZWKUDWHV in consumer utility. In general, e  and e  differ, implying that utility OHYHOV
ns
differ. Since the conclusion on identical utility growth applies even when Rû R, it does
ns  
not hinge on R&D subsidy policies. Both countries experience identical steady state
equilibrium growth rates even when they adopt different R&D subsidy policies, have
different population sizes, produce different types of goods, etc.
To understand the intuition behind this result, we must remember that both
countries are connected by trade. This means that when any firm in the world innovates,
consumers in both countries buy the new higher quality product. Since consumers in
both countries benefit from any innovation, both countries must grow at the same rate.
Differences in R&D subsidies cause international differences in utilityOHYHOV, not utility
JURZWKrates. Thus the distinction between growth and level effects that is emphasized
in the exogenous growth theory literature is also important when analyzing this
endogenous growth model.0/"log(H QZ/8V)%(1&")log(H QZ/8QZ)&"log(H VZ/8V)&(1&")log(H VZ/8QZ).
13
0LJUDWLRQ,QFHQWLYHV
Given that consumer utility grows at the same rate in the two countries, if there are any
incentives for international migration in a steady state equilibrium, they must be present
at time t=0. Thus, to determine migration incentives, we will compare the static utilities
of a Southern worker at t=0 with the static utility this worker would get from working in
the North. To make this comparison, we first need to calculate how consumer
expenditure differs in the two countries. In the North, total income before taxes equals
wL +DNA  and total taxes equal ws R (1-"). We will assume that taxes are spread
nw n n
evenly across all income earners (wage as well as interest income). Then a Northern
worker with one unit of labor pays taxes [ws R (1-")][w/(wL  +DNA )]. Since this
nn n w
worker earns before tax income of w, (after tax) steady state consumer expenditure for
this Northern worker is e /w[1-(ws R (1-"))/(wL +DNA )]. Using similar calculations,
nw n n n w
a Southern worker with one unit of labor has (after tax) steady state consumer
expenditure e /1-(s R" )/(L  +D(1-N)A ). Substituting these expenditure expressions
sw s s s w
into (13) and (14) and evaluating at t=0, we obtain the migration incentive measure 
If M is positive, then workers would gain by moving from the South to the North.
1DWLRQDO,QFRPH$FFRXQWLQJ
Since investment and government expenditure both equal zero and since international
trade is balanced, nominal gross national product in each country equals consumption
expenditure, i.e. GNP =E  and  GNP = E .  In a steady-state equilibrium, E  and E  are
nn s s n s
constants and thus nominal GNP does not change over time in either the North or the
South.
However,  UHDO GNP rises over time as the quality of products improve. With
nominal GNP constant in a steady-state equilibrium, we must have deflation in terms of
the quality adjusted, i.e. real, prices. To see this, we need to first solve for the general
relationship between innovation and deflation. When the R&D intensity is I, a typical
R&D race has time duration 1/I. The relationship between the quality-adjusted price
after the innovation (P ) and before the innovation (P )  is P = P /8 in both countries. ra rb  ra rb *13
Q











It follows that a real price index P (t) must satisfy P (1/I)=1/8 P (0)=P (0)exp[A/I] r r  r  r 
where  A represents the inflation rate. Solving yields the quality adjusted inflation rate as
A=-I log8. Thus, the innovation rate I is associated with a negative rate of inflation.
Using this innovation-deflation relationship, we can solve for real GNP in both
countries. Let P (t) and  P (t) be the price indexes that apply to the low-tech r," r,1-" 
industries in the South and the high-tech industries in the North, respectively. To
simplify, assume that both price indexes take on a unity value at time t=0. The real GNP
at time t in the North equals "E /P (t) +(1-")E / P (t), or
nn
r," r,1-"
In the corresponding way we obtain real GNP in the South as 
Clearly, real GNP growth rates are identical in the two countries. In the more relevant
case where I log8  >I  log8 , that is, when he North is more innovative than the South,
n   n s s
the growth rate in the two countries gradually increases over time and asymptotically
approaches I  log 8 . The long run real GNP growth rate is thus determined in the
n n
North. This is so since the higher innovation rate in the North implies that the real (i.e.
quality-adjusted) prices of Northern products over time falls faster than the real prices
of Southern products. Eventually, consumers will extract most of their utility from
consuming goods that are produced in the North. Hence, the relative contribution of the
South to the world’s real GNP falls over time.
5HVXOWV
We are now ready to analyze how international differences generate incentives for
international migration.  We solve the system of five equations ((6), (7), (8), (9) and
(11)) in five unknowns ( E , E , R , R  and w) and the variables in (13) through (19)
ns n s
follow straightforwardly. This system of non-linear equations is not analytically15
tractable and thus we will use computer simulations to shed light on the model´s
properties. An important advantage of this approach is that by evaluating the model
under what we believe are plausible parameter values, we are able to rule out some
theoretical possibilities as being unrealistic.
The main reason why our model is complicated is that we allow for differences
across countries. In previous work on the relationship between trade and growth by
Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991a,b), it was assumed that both trading countries were
identical in every respect. Two country endogenous growth models become
considerably more complicated when either structural or public policy differences lead
to cross country differences in the endogenous variables. Such differences, more
specifically in relative utilities, however, are necessary for migration incentives to be
present.
In our computer simulations, we use as benchmark parameter values 8 =1.28, 
n
8  =1.15, D=.05, "=0.5, L =1, L =2, b=1, s =s =0.1, a =4.75 and N=0.9. The economic
sn  s n s
interpretation of these parameter choices is as follows: 8 =1.28 and 8  =1.15 means that
ns
each innovation represents a 28% and a 15% improvement in the North and South,
respectively. Consumers are willing to pay 28% more for each new higher quality high-
tech product and 15% more for each new higher quality low-tech product. Given (4), 
D=.05 implies that the steady state market interest rate is 5%. L =1.0 and L =2.0,
n s
together with "=.5 implies that twice as much labor is employed per industry in the
South than in the North. 
To interpret the diminishing returns to R&D effort parameter b, first note that the
industry-wide instantaneous probability of R&D success is I /R /(a+bR ) and
nn n
I /R /(a+bR ). This implies that the time duration of a R&D race is exponentially
ss s
distributed and that the expected duration is 1/I =(a+bR )/R  and 1/I =(a+bR )/R . Letting R
nn n ss s n
and R  approach +4, we obtain that b=1 years is the shortest possible expected duration
s
for an R&D race in each country. Subsidy rates s =s =0.1 means that both countries
ns
support R&D by 10%. Given the benchmark parameter values 8  =1.28, 8  =1.15,
ns
D =.05, L =1.0, L =2.0, b=1 and s =s =0.1, a=4.75 implies a .51 percent growth rate of
n s h f
GNP. For the U.S. over the period 1929-82, Denison (1985, p. 30) finds that the rate of
GNP growth attributable to advances in knowledge is on the order of one half percent
per year. Finally, N=.9 means that the North owns 90 % of the world´s assets.16
With these parameter values, we obtain the benchmark solution given in column 2
of Table 1. In this table are reported industry R&D employment levels (R  and R ),
ns
consumer expenditures (E  and E ), the common steady state utility growth rate
ns
( "R /(a+bR )log 8  + (1-")R /(a+bR )log 8 ), the relative wage of Northern workers (w),
sss n  nn
the migration incentive measure (M), as well as several welfare measures.We measure
the welfare of native workers by calculating the discounted utility of a worker with one
unit of labor to supply and no asset holdings (W  (e ) and W  (e )). To measure the
nn w ss w
welfare of capital owners in the North, we calculate the discounted utility of an
individual that has no labor income but owns the share N of world assets. This
individual would have after tax expenditure e =DNA [1-(ws R (1-"))/(wL +DNA) ]  a n d
nc w n n n w
discounted utility W  (e ). The discounted welfare of capital owners in the South is
nn c
similarly calculated as W  (e ) where e  = D(1-N)A [1-(s R (1-"))/(L +
ss c s c w s s s
D (1-N)A )]. Finally, we are also interested in how the welfare of workers with
w
significant asset holdings (rich workers) are affected by immigration. The discounted
welfare of a rich native worker in the North is measured by W  (e ) where 
nr w
e= E  -  w ) L  and )L  is the increase in the Northern labor force due to migration. 
rw n n n
The correctness of the results reported in Table 1 can be directly verified by
plugging these solution values back into equations (6),  (7), (8), (9), (11) and (12). 
(IIHFWVRI3RSXODWLRQ5HVWULFWLRQVLQWKH6RXWK
When a worker migrates from the South to the Norththe population decreases in the
South and increases in the North. As a prelude to analyzing the effects of migration, we
first study the effects of a population decrease in the South, by itself. This exercise
sheds important light on how the model works. We are able to solve for the effects of a
population decrease in the South on the R&D investments decision of firms in both
countries and the concomitant effects on relative wages, growth, welfare and migration
incentives. Population restrictions in less developed countries are also interesting to
study from a policy point of view since restricting populations has been an objective of
the World Bank and other international organizations, as well as of many governments
in the less developed countries.
In column 3 of Table 1, the steady-state solution is presented when Ldecreases
s17
from 2.00 to 1.95. A smaller Southern labor force implies lower consumer expenditure
E since there are fewer Southern workers earning wage income. As expenditures drops,
s 
demand for goods and production labor fall in the North and to maintain full
employment of labor, it follows from (8) that the relative wage of Northern workers w
must fall to clear the labor market. If the relative wage w falls enough so that total
demand for Northern production labor (E +E )/w8  remains unchanged, then (6) and
n s  n
(8) imply that the Northern labor devoted to R&D R  remains unchanged. This is exactly
n
what happens when the Southern labor force decreases. Not surprisingly, the drop in the
relative wage of Northern workers w leads to a decrease in Northern consumer
expenditure E .
n
Since consumer expenditure falls in both countries, the demand for Southern
goods (E +E )/8  and the profits earned by Southern firms both decrease. It follows
n s n
from the R&D condition (7) that Southern firms devote less resources to R&D. Less
R&D effort in the South, in turn, lowers each consumer’s utility growth rate (from
.01176 to .01159%) and the common GNP growth rate (from .51086 to .50326%). From
(10), a lower Southern R&D effort  R  and a lower relative wage w of Northern workers
s
both contribute to lowering the value of world assets A , which given (11) and (12),
w
further reduces expenditure in both countries.
It follows that a decrease in the Southern labor force L  lowers the discounted
s
welfare of Northern workers because the world economy grows more slowly and
Northern workers earn a lower relative wage. Interestingly, the same developments
increase the discounted welfare of Southern workers. The lower Northern relative wage
w benefits Southern workers as the consumer price index "8 +(1-")8 w falls due to
sn
imported goods becoming cheaper. The computer simulations reveal that the benefit to
Southern workers from lower consumer prices more than offsets their reduced utility
growth rate. Of course, since profits decrease, asset holders in both countries become
poorer when L  decreases. Thus, capital owners in both countries lose when the South
s
shrinks in size.
For an individual that obtains labor income but not asset income, his/her
migration incentives are determined by comparing the utility derived from working in
the North with the utility derived from working in the South. In the benchmark solution,
migration incentives are present since the utility level of a worker is higher in the North18
than in the South. A decrease in the Southern labor force clearly reduces the incentive
for Southern workers to emigrate to the North since the discounted welfare of each
Northern worker falls and the discounted welfare of each Southern worker rises.
 (IIHFWVRIDQ,PPLJUDWLRQ4XRWDLQWKH1RUWK
Since population restrictions in the South actually lower growth and welfare in the
North, we now ask if a better strategy (for the North) is to allow Southern workers to
enter the Northern labor market.  In the simulations, we capture the effects of
international worker migration from the South to the North by lowering the Southern
population from 2.00 to 1.95 and raising the Northern population from 1.00 to 1.05.
This represents an immigration quota of 0.05.  The simulation results are presented in
column 4 of Table 1.
It is useful to first compare the migration simulation results (in column 4) with the
Southern population decrease results (in column 3).  In both cases, the Southern labor
supply is the same (L =1.95).  Since (7) and (9) together uniquely determine world
s
expenditure  and Southern R&D employment for given R , world expenditure and
s
Southern R&D employment must be the same in both cases.  When workers migrate to
the North, this increases Northern consumer expenditure  but this is exactly offset by a
corresponding expenditure decrease in the South.  By increasing the Northern labor
supply, South to North migration also depresses the Northern relative wage w.  Given
that world consumer expenditure  does not change and w drops, (6) implies that
migration must increase Northern R&D employment and as a result, the common utility
growth rate in both countries (compared to the population restriction case).
Comparing the migration simulation results to the benchmark "no-migration" case
(column 2), we find that, by raising the Northern labor supply and lowering the
Southern labor supply, migration significantly decreases the Northern relative wage w. 
The size of this wage decrease is reflected in the fact that total Northern consumer
expenditure falls even though migration increases the total number of Northern wage
earners. Since migration decreases Southern labor supply, not surprisingly Southern
consumer expenditure also falls. Southern firms respond to the decrease in world
consumer expenditure by decreasing their R&D effort R . But the big drop in wages
s
makes R&D more attractive in the North and firms respond by raising their R&D effort19
there (R  increases).  We find that R  increases more than R  decreases, which represents
nn s
one reason why migration increases utility and GNP growth rates.  The second reason
for the increase in growth rates is that R&D workers are more productive in the North
(where 8=1.28) than in the South (where 8=1.15). For example, an Indian researcher
would appear to contribute considerably more by working for a high-tech U.S. firm than
by working for a low-tech Indian firm. 
Even though growth rates increase in the North, it does not follow that Northern
workers benefit from immigration. In fact, we find that discounted welfare for the
typical worker in the North with no asset income (only wage income) drops from
1.42290 to 1.38456 due to the immigration quota.  Northern workers benefit from the
higher economic growth that immigration generates (real GNP growth increases from
0.51086% to 0.52613%) but this is more than offset by the decrease in their wages (the
Northern relative wage drops from 1.90808 to 1.78285). The simulations show that
growth considerations are dominated by wage considerations. 
Given that workers lose from immigration, the question remains: do capital
owners benefit from immigration quotas?  Since immigration leads to higher R&D
effort in the North, the instantaneous probability that firms are driven out of business by
further innovation rises.  Also taking into account that immigration decreases world
consumer expenditure, (6) implies that the stock market value of Northern firms
unambiguously declines, which obviously hurts capital owners. Counterbalancing this,
immigration lowers wages in the North, contributing to a decline in consumer prices
and the cost of living for Northern capital owners.  We find that the decline in stock
market value is more significant and discounted welfare of the typical Northern capital
owner decreases slightly from .22207 to .22177 due to immigration.  However, this
result is non-robust and hinges on our assumed benchmark parameter values.  In several
simulations with alternative parameter values, we find that Northern capital owners gain
slightly from immigration (see footnote 8, below). Our overall conclusion is that capital
owners are not significantly affected (in either direction) by immigration quotas.
Besides the migrants themselves, we find that the only group that significantly
benefits from immigration quotas are Southern workers. Discounted welfare for the
typical Southern worker with no asset income (only wage income) increases from
.74840 to .77980 due to the Northern immigration quota. The main reason why20
To study the long run effects if  the North pursues a sustained policy of increasing
8
immigration,  we have simulated gradual increases of worker immigration by
assuming the following labor supply changes in five consequtive simulations: i)L
n
=1.00 and L  =2.00, ii) L =1.15 and L  =1.85, iii) L =1.30 and L  =1.70, and iv)L
sn  s n  s n
=1.45, and L  =1.55. (The results are available upon request.) As immigration
s
increases, the common  utility growth rate continuously rises from 0.12% in the basic
solution to 0.15% in the fourth simulation. Similarly, real GNP growth rises from
.51% to .64%. The discounted welfare of a Northern worker falls from 1.42 to 1.13.
For a  rich Northern worker, discounted welfare falls from 1.64 to 1.35. At the same
time, the discounted welfare of a Southern worker rises from 0.75 to 1.06. The
discounted welfare of Northern capital owners  decreases if migration increases  labor
supply there from 1.15, but increases with further immigration.This shows that the
qualitative effects on capital owner welfare are, in general, indeterminate.
Southern workers benefit is simply that the prices of imported goods drop when other
workers emigrate to the North.  Southern workers also benefit from the faster rate of
economic growth that emigration generates (R  increases).
n
Layard HWDO. (1992) suggested the implementation ofimmigration quotas as part
of a long run immigration policy to eliminate the incentives to migrate from Eastern to
Western Europe. Figure 1 shows the utility effects of such a policy of mass migration
into the Northern country and how it eventually eliminates any incentives for
international migration. The vertical axis measures the (log) utility of workers in the
North and in the South. Initially, at time T=1, the utility level is much higher in the
North than in the South but utility growth is identical in both countries. At time period
T=2, the Northern government allows immigration of a large number of workers from
the South. This lowers the instantaneous utility level in the North and raises it in the
South, and has the added effect of increasing the growth rate so that both countries’
native populations enter a higher utility growth trajectory. At T=3 there is another
inflow of labor that again lowers the instantaneous utility level in the North and raises it
in the South and is accompanied by a higher growth rate. At T=4, the last immigrants 
arrive. Hereafter, Southern workers have no incentives to emigrate and the utility levels
as well as the utility growth rates are equalized.
8
One qualification of our results is worth stressing. We have assumed that workers
in the South also benefit from the quality improvements of high-tech goods. If the
assumption of identical preferences is dropped, and if, for instance, consumers in the
South demand mainly low-tech goods, then our conclusion that the South benefits from21
the emigration of its workers may be reversed. 
(IIHFWVRID0LJUDWLRQ7D[
An important conclusion that we reached above is that Northern natives (both workers
and capital owners) are hurt by immigration and that Southern workers (both natives
and migrants) are the ones that benefit from immigration quotas in the North. Unless
policy maker can rely on pure altruism in the North, an immigration quota policy could
be politically infeasible if voters are well informed. We ask in this section if a migration
tax can compensate Northern native workers enough so that they benefit from
immigration. By a migration tax, we mean a tax on the wage income of immigrants,
where the tax revenue generated is transferred to Northern native workers. Such a tax
has no allocative effects but simply transfers expenditures from immigrants to natives.
The effects of a 20 percent migration tax on the .05 workers that migrate from the
South to the North are presented in column 5. Not surprisingly, this migration tax
lowers the incentives of Southern workers to migrate (from .48042 to .25763), and
raises the discounted welfare of Northern native workers (from 1.38456 to 1.39858).
But these native workers would have been even better off if no immigration had been
allowed (discounted welfare of Northern native workers is 1.42290 in the benchmark
case). Experiments with alternative tax rates and immigration quotas show that this
result is robust: Migration taxes cannot alter the basic conclusion that immigration hurts
the native population.
(IIHFWVRI5LFK:RUNHU,PPLJUDWLRQ
So far we have discussed the effects of poor worker immigration: workers that arrive in
the North with nothing in their pockets and rely entirely on wage income for their
financial support. What if the North only allows for immigration of rich workers, that is, 
workers with significant asset holdings? Are workers in the North likely to be more
favorable to such an immigration policy? 
The effects of a .05 immigration quota are presented in column 6, where the .05
immigrants bring with them 25 percent of South’s assets. Comparing columns 4 and 6,
we see that whether immigrants bring assets or not, post-immigration R&D employment
levels are the same in the two countries. Thus, both types of immigration generate the22
It is natural to study R&D subsidies in quality ladders models since the presence of
9
R&D externalities implies that the laissez-faire equilibrium is typically not optimal.
See Grossman and Helpman (1991a). 
same utility and GNP growth rates. However, having rich instead of poor immigrants
increases the Northern tax base, implying that Northern native workers are taxed less
when wealthier individuals immigrate. The discounted welfare of Northern native
workers is higher with rich worker immigration than with poor worker immigration and
it follows that migration incentives are also higher with rich worker immigration quotas.
Nevertheless, we still find that that native workers in the North are better off with no
immigration than with rich worker immigration. Discounted welfare for a worker in the
North drops from 1.42290 to 1.38463 due to rich worker immigration and for a rich
native worker, discounted welfare drops from 1.64497 to 1.61169.

(IIHFWVRI5	'6XEVLGLHV
The policy experiments that we have studied so far have all been related to immigration
quotas. To study large quotas is natural since the incentives for migration are so strong,
for instance, from Mexico and South America to the US, or from Eastern Europe and
Northern Africa to the EU. Given that all the migration policies that we studied  involve
a political economy problem as the policies lower the discounted welfare of workers in
the North (compared to the benchmark case), it is natural to proceed to study other
policies. Though we expect only migration quotas to be able to substantially affect
migration incentives, we can still ask if there are any policies that benefit the Northern
workers and at the same time reduce migration incentives. In column 7 of Table 1, the
steady-state effects of a 1 percent increase in the Northern R&D subsidy (from s =0.10
n
to s =0.11) holding s =0.10 are reported.  A higher Northern R&D subsidy has the
ns 9
potential to lower migration incentives since Northern workers have to pay higher taxes
to finance the subsidy increase and Southern workers get to “free ride” on the Northern
government’s growth promoting intervention.
We find that a higher Northern R&D subsidy does indeed lead to faster economic
growth in both countries (the utility growth rate increases from .01176 to .01186).
Furthermore, the discounted welfare of a poor Northern worker rises from 1.42290 to23
1.42554 and the discounted welfare of a rich Northern worker rises from 1.64497 to
1.64633. Thus, the Northern government can promote the welfare of both rich and poor
workers by subsidising R&D investments on the margin. However, the incentives for
migration from the South to the North does not fall, but increases slightly (from .53941
to .54002). While Southern workers benefit from the faster growth that the higher
Northern subsidy generates without incurring any increase in their taxes, they are also
hurt by the increase in the relative wage w (from 1.90808 to 1.91298) which implies
higher prices for goods imported from the North. In contrast, Northern workers benefit
from the faster rate of economic growth and the higher Northern relative wage. The fact
that they have to pay higher taxes to finance the R&D subsidy increase turns out to be of
secondary importance.
A higher Northern R&D subsidy also lowers the rewards from winning an R&D
race since firms are driven out of business at a faster rate, implying that capital owners
lose. By comparing discounted welfare of rich workers with that of capital owners, we
see that if workers own the capital stock they will experience a net gain while if assets
are separately owned, then the asset owners lose. For workers, the wage hike more than
compensates for their loss in asset values.
We started this section by asking if a Northern R&D subsidy would raise native
workers’ welfare and lower migration incentives. We found that welfare goes up but
that migration incentives increased. Surprisingly, it is a Southern R&D subsidy increase
that has the desired effects. Although an R&D subsidy in the North is more efficient in
raising growth than a R&D subsidy in the South (8 =1.28 and 8 =1.15), R&D subsidies
ns
in the South have the added positive effect of limiting the international utility
differences among workers and hence reducing migration incentives. The effects of a 1
percent increase in the Southern R&D subsidy (from s =0.10 to s =0.11 holding s =0.10)
ss n
are presented in the last column of Table 1.
5REXVWQHVVWHVWV
Though we have evaluated immigration policies under what we believe are reasonable
parameter values, we must ask to what extent our results hinge on the specific values
assumed. We are particularly interested in possible cases where discounted welfare of24
Northern native workers increases as a result of immigration. The liberal immigration
policies that we study would then be easy to justify.
We find that there are two cases in which migration benefits the native population.
First, if the rate of discount is low enough, then the positive growth effect of
immigration dominates the negative wage effect for Northern workers. But we find that
the discount rate must be unreasonably low, below 1 percent, for immigration to
generate a positive effect on the discounted welfare of the native workers in the North.
Second, if there is a large enough difference in the rate of quality upgrading across the
two countries, then immigration has a positive welfare effect on Northern natives. For
instance, when we set 8 =1.75 and 8 =1.10, we find that immigration boosts the growth
ns
rate to such an extent that the higher growth more than compensates for the drop in
Northern wage that immigration also generates. Table 2 shows the effects on a few
selected variables. When the 8’s differ a great deal, migration has only a small negative
effect in the South but a large positive effect in the North.
7DEOH7KHEHQFKPDUNDQGPLJUDWLRQVLPXODWLRQVZKHQ8  DQG8  
QV
Endogenous variables Benchmark  South to North
solution migration
GNP growth rate 1.74878 1.82839
Migration incentive .47288 .42097
Disc. welfare of a 2.17038 2.17548
Northern worker
Disc. welfare of a rich 2.52440 2.53622
Northern worker
Such high 8 -values seem, however, problematic as they imply unreasonable allocations
n
of labor to R&D activities. In the benchmark simulation of Table 2, the North is
allocating 76% of its labor force to R&D! Thus, both cases of Northern native workers
benefiting from immigration quotas appear to have limited empirical relevance.
We also reran all our policy experiments with high and low values of the
remaining parameters and found that our qualitative results hold. Decreased population
in the South, migration quotas, R&D subsidies, migration taxes, and immigration of25
As already noted, the effects on capital owners’ discounted welfare depend on
10
parameter values that we choose. The alternative parameter values were b=.2 or 1.9,
D=.01 or .10 and L  =.2 or 1.75.
n
rich workers all have the same qualitative effects at these alternative parameter values.  
10
Finally, it is worth considering if our wage effects of immigration are of a
reasonable magnitude. Altonji and Card (1991) find that a 1% increase in a country´s
labor force due to immigration lowers wages by 1.2%. Compared to our benchmark
simulation, immigration that increases the labor force by 1% in the North (and lowers it
in the South by 0.5%) lowers the relative wage by  .86%. (An exogenous increase in the
Northern labor force by 1% lowers the Northern relative wage by 0.38%. ) The wage
effects of immigration in our simulations appear to be of roughly the right magnitude.
 )LQDO5HPDUNV
We analyze the effects of immigration quotas on growth and discounted welfare using a
North-South version of the quality ladders endogenous growth model. This model has
attractive properties: Workers in the South have strong incentives to migrate to the
North, and compared with the North, the South is characterized by low wages, labor
abundance and production of low-tech goods.  
We find that higher immigration quotas in the North increase the utility (and per
capita GNP) growth rates of workers in both the North and the South. Immigration
quotas also depress the real wages of workers in the North. Thus, in evaluating the
overall effects of quotas on the discounted welfare of Northern workers, one must
weigh the static utility losses from lower wages against the dynamic utility gains from
higher per capita economic growth. If there is a sufficiently large difference between the
R&D productivity of workers in the two countries, then the positive growth effects of
immigration dominate and higher immigration quotas increase the discounted welfare of
Northern workers. However, large R&D productivity differences between the North and
the South are associated with an unreasonably large Northern R&D sector. We find that
for plausble parameter values, the negative wage effects of immigration dominate and
higher immigration quotas decrease the discounted welfare of Northern workers. 26
As previously noted, the result that capital owners lose from immigration does not
11
always hold. The price level also falls as a result of immigration and sometimes the
positive effect on asset owners’ welfare of a lower price level may dominate.
See Benhabib (1996).
12
A standard result in static models of migration, as represented by for instance
Berry and Soligo (1969), is that immigration benefits a representative agent in the host
country. Interestingly, our dynamic model of migration yields the contrary result. The
representative agent in our model is the rich worker in the North. We find that not only
does immigration depress this worker’s wage but the value of his assets also falls.
11
Because immigration depresses the real wage of Northern workers, Northern firms
respond by devoting more resources to R&D activities and innovations occur more
frequently in each industry. This higher rate of market turnover in turn leads to lower
expected discounted profits for innovative firms, or alternatively stated, a lower stock
market value of firms. Thus, higher immigration quotas lower the discounted welfare of
Northern capital owners in addition to lowering the discounted welfare of Northern
workers. Our model suggests that the political economy problem associated with
immigration policy is more severe than has previously been recognized.
12
As we find that immigration in general lowers the discounted welfare of the native
population in the North, we analyze alternative immigration policies that potentially
could improve the situation of the native population. If we impose a tax on immigrants,
and transfer the revenues to the natives, natives are still worse off compared to the no-
migration case. Also if the immigration quota is restricted to apply only to rich
immigrants, the native population still loses.
Therefore, our analysis suggests that the planned labor market integration between
the present members of the EU and the candidate Eastern European countries will have
a negative effect on the welfare of EU natives, workers as well as owners of firms.
Although the technological differences between the US and Mexico are larger, the
model suggests that they are not large enough to generate a positive welfare effect in the
US from large scale Mexican immigration. Thus, to justify a policy involving large
immigration quotas, one would have to assume altruism on the part of the immigration
country. That altruism does play a role for immigration policy in developed countries is27
shown by the large share of refugees in recent migration flows to several West
European countries. 
In addition to these public policy conclusions, the model also has interesting
implications for cross-country differences in economic growth rates. Because the
countries are connected by trade in goods and any innovation benefits consumers in
both countries, we find that structural or public policy differences between the two
countries do not generateDQ\ differences in utility (or per capita GNP) growth rates.
Public policy and/or structural differences generate differences in utility OHYHOVacross
countries but not differences in utility JURZWK rates. The absence of growth differences
simplifies our analysis because it implies that migration incentives are completely
determined by international differences in worker utility levels (at any point in time).
It is of potential importance that we have assumed competitive wages. While this
may be an acceptable assumption for the US, it is not necessarily a good assumption to
make for the European Union where, in general, the wage is a bargaining outcome and
labor markets are highly regulated. Regulated labor markets at fixed wages imply that
employers cannot replace natives for immigrants at a wage rate below the prevailing
one. Consequently, these economies experience immigration mainly in periods when
there are many vacancies. While one therefore can expect less immigration in regulated
labor markets, the influx of immigrants to such markets could still be expected to
adversely affect native workers in the wage bargaining process with dynamic
implications similar to those derived in this paper. 28
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s
Northern relative 1.90808 1.86293 1.78285 1.78285 1.78285 1.91298 1.90515
wage, w
Migration incentive .53941 .51850 .48042 .25763 .48049 .54002 .53872
Disc. welfare of a 1.42290 1.40107 1.38456 1.39858 1.38463 1.42554 1.42383
Northern worker
Disc. welfare of a .74840 .75487 .77980 .77980 .77977 .74897 .74928
Southern worker
Disc. welfare of a 1.64497 1.62136 1.60545 1.61947 1.61169 1.64633 1.64539
rich Northern worker 
Disc. welfare of  a .22207 .22029 .22177 .22177 .22795 .22079 .22156
Northern asset owner 
Disc. welfare of a .02476 .02457 .02474 .24743 .01856 .02466 .02468
Southern asset owner 31
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Q V Q￿ V Q V
Endogenous Bench- Migra- Migra- Migra-
variables mark tion=.15  tion=.30 tion=.45
solution
Northern R&D .28265 .351226 .41980 .48837
employment, R
n
Southern R&D .35274 .31164 .27055 .22945
employment, R  
s
Utility growth rate .01176 .01280 .01379 .01473
GNP growth rate   .51086 .55593 .59883 .63960
Northern 2.17890 2.03287 1.88610 1.73880
expenditures, E
n
Southern 2.01545 1.86374 1.71277 1.56234
expenditures, E
s
Northern relative 1.90808 1.56212 1.28961 1.06940
wage, w
Migration incentive .53941 .36712 .20546 .04923
Disc. welfare of a 1.42290 1.31301 1.21577 1.12736
Northern worker
Disc. welfare of a .74840 .84481 .94878 1.06223
Southern worker
Disc. welfare of a 1.64497 1.53214 1.43366 1.34563
rich Northern worker 
Disc. welfare of  a .22207 .22179 .22312 .22589
Northern asset owner 
Disc. welfare of a .02476 .02477 .02495 .02529
Southern asset owner 